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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
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INC.

/riaintiff and Appellant,

rT
I

I

)

)

)

M. LENTZ,

and Respondent
md Cross Appellant.

)

Civil No.
12503

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN ANSWER TO
PETITION FOR REHEARING

I-PREFACE
!Defendant-Respondent respectfully opposes

l

s Petition for Rehearing

moves that the same be dismissed upon grounds

t no showing has been made that the Supreme

firt failed to consider some material, point in
erred in its conclusions, or that some

ftter has been discovered which was unknown at
le

time of original hearing.

The Utah Supreme

has repeatedly held that in order to justify
!rehearing one of these criterion must be met
a strong case must be made. In re McKnight,

IP. 299 (Utah 1886) •
1

_,,,,,....-

loefendant submits that none of the above have

1
0

t

shown by plaintiff and that plaintiff's
should be dismissed.

!

II-RESIDENCY OF DEFENDANT
trial court held that the plaintiff had not

I

ttained its burden of proving the defendant's
by a preponderance of the evidence
concluded that the attachment based on non-

!

idency was therefore invalid.

jThe great weight of authority holds that

idence for attachment purposes is "generally
of intention coupled with affirmative action
·is determined from the facts and circumstances
each particular case."

l,

6 Am Jur 2nd, Section

Attachment and Garnishment at P. 721.

The

determined, however, that defendant's
'ressed intention to remain a resident and his
tions in furtherance thereof were not overcome
evidence to the contrary.

And in

'absence of a showing of an abuse of ·discretion

ba

determination must stand.

The record

tarly shows that the evidence presented by
fendant provided a reasonable bas is for the
to determine that defendant was ';\ resident
III-THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS
THE ACCOUNTING CHANGE
MADE BY THE SUPREME
COURT.
The testimony at the trial was that the funds
lthe houseboat joint checking account all came
2

rentals.

(T-498) Any transfer from

Bankl\niericard account were funds received from
eboat rentals paid for by customers using their
Arnericard, rather than paying by check or cash.
·amount of $3,155.69 received from the houseboat
.als was in the houseboat checking account at
!

1end of October, 1969, and was transferred to
11frog Marina and received by it. (T-498) Bullfrog
Jd, therefore,

be charged for this amount. Any

ies which were due Bullfrog or Lentz from the

eboat operation had in the past been drawn
the checking account and had been included as
-rt of the amount each had received.

Therefore,

amounts that were drawn on this account or
I

· in the account should be charged against the

j:y who received it.
i

$100.00 referred to on page 8 of plaintiff's
been accounted for already in the accountaccepted by the trial court, and is included

the figure of $18,583.34 quoted by the Supreme

in its opinion.

Bullfrog cannot claim,

that it is being charged for this
mt again.
IV-THE COURT CORRECTLY CONSTRUED
THE CON'l'HACTS BETWEEN THE
PARTIES •

.Plaintiff contends that the only person who
affected by a determination

there

ia sub-concession agreement between the parties
Ithe plaintiff, Bullfrog.
19atently

Such a content ion

wrong since the defendant, Lentz,

3

-...-

r be

greatly affected.

The profits were to

on a 20%-80% basis.

Any amount that

:a have to be paid to the Park Service because
sub-concession contract would be considered
xpense of operation and would, therefore,
ce considerably the amount available to be
ded as profit.

argues that the contracts were not
I

ired to be submitted to the Park Service for
oval.

The understanding of the parties was

effect that the contracts were to be subed to the Park Service for approval.

In fact,

ndant 's Exhibits No. 35 and No. 36 are letters
the Park Service to Bullfrog requesting that
mbrnit to it the lease agreement.

The reason

the Park Service's interest is set forth in
I

ndant 's Exhibit No. 35 which states,

"This

trance is necessary to ensure that there was
of you entering into a subss ion contract. "

.

e question of two weeks notice of termination
rred on page 13 of plaintiff's Petition for
aring was not raised at trial nor on appeal
certainly cannot be raised for the first time
for Rehearing.
11.

Harrison vs. Harker,

541, 142 P. 716: In re Lowe's Estate,

249 P.

I

!laintiff on page 12 of Petition for Rehearing

1

tes that defendant acknowledged that he was
control and direction of Bullfrog.

It

':ignificant, however, to consider the fact that

4

te

employment contract stated under the termina-

fon clause that Lentz was to "in general manage
is division of Bullfrog operations," as well

be free of "unreasonable restrictions
rformance of work."

in the

Cerlainly Bullfrog's actions

diverting control of the advertising and reservaions from Lentz constituted a basis for rejection

:the contract when one considers that plaintiff
mmenced using defendant's trade name "Aqua Cruz"
dreceiving the reservations directly.
V-CONCLUSION

I

The Supreme court's decision is supported by
e evidence and plaintiff has not shown that

ne

Supreme Court failed to consider some material

int, erred in its conclusions, or that some

tter has been discovered which was unknown at
e time of original hearing.
r Rehearing should,

Plaintiff's Petition

therefore, be denied.

Respectfully submitted,
DUANE A. FRANDSEN
of the firm of ?randsen
and Keller
Professional Building
Price, Utah
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